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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985 I wrote an article which examined the problem of delay in
the rendering of awards in maritime arbitrations held in New York
City.' As the article stated, its purpose was not to examine all of the
causes of delay.2 Instead, it sought to isolate and describe one particu-
lar cause of delay: the failure of arbitrators to deliberate and issue their
awards in a timely fashion.'
The article noted that as the time between the closing of evidence
and the rendering of the award has grown unreasonably long, many
maritime parties have decided to arbitrate in cities other than New
York.4 The article detailed the causes and consequences of delay,6 and
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maritime law with the firm of Baker & McKenzie (New York) and is the Secretary of
the Committee on Admiralty & Maritime Law of the International Law Section of the
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1. Jarvis, The Problem of Post-Hearing Delay in Maritime Arbitrations: "When
Did You Say We Would Receive the Arbitrators' Award?", 9 MD. J. INT'L. L. &
TRADE 19 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Jarvis].
2. Id. at 36.
3. Id. at 36-37. As the article explained, only arbitrator-inspired delay was stud-
ied. Id.
4. Id. at 44-45.
5. Id. at 37-42 and 54-56. The article noted that delay in the rendering of the
award has two adverse consequences. First, parties lose confidence in the system, are
reluctant to enter into arbitration in the future, and may forego meritorious claims or
settle them for less than would be the case if a properly-functioning arbitration system
was in place. Second, some arbitration awards become valueless by the time they are
(199)
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predicted that the number of maritime arbitrations held in New York
City would continue to decrease unless steps were taken to shorten the
time taken to issue awards.6
Following the release of the article in July, 1985, copies began to
circulate throughout the New York maritime bar. Later, copies began
circulating among members of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, the
principal maritime arbitration body in New York City. The article and
its recommendations became the subject of much debate, and on
March 12, 1986, I appeared before the Society at its monthly luncheon
to discuss further the problem of delay.'
At that luncheon, the Society's Executive Board announced that
henceforth the Society would encourage its members to render their
awards within 120 days of the closing of the evidence.' Although this
was a longer period than either the forty-five days advocated by my
article, 9 or the ninety days which once had been required by the Soci-
ety's rules,' 0 the Executive Board's announcement was an important
first step in solving the problems of delay."
Since the Executive Board's action, members of the Society have
begun to follow the 120-day guideline in arbitrations commenced after
March, 1986. Moreover, the subject of post-hearing delay has become a
major focus of attention in New York maritime circles. Thus, in many
ways, my article has achieved its goal of reducing delay.
Despite the progress achieved to date, delay continues to plague
New York maritime arbitrations. In his article, Delay in Maritime Ar-
bitrations - Post-Hearing and Otherwise: An Arbitrator's View, 2 Don-
ald E. Zubrod argues that much of the delay is party-inspired. 13
issued because the losing party has become judgment proof while the award was
delayed.
6. Id. at 44 n.109 and accompanying text.
7. An edited version of the speech appears in Jarvis, Problems with and Solutions
for New York Maritime Arbitration [1986] LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L. Q. 535 [herein-
after cited as Problems].
8. Id. at 538 n.18.
9. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 57.
10. Id. at 48 n.125.
11. The Executive Board also stated that it would at some future date review its
120-day suggestion to determine whether the recommendation should be modified or be
made mandatory. Problems, supra note 7, at 538 n.18. In January, 1987, the Society
announced that it had amended Section 27 of its Rules to incorporate the 120-day
guideline. However, the amended rule specifically states that a failure by a Panel to
issue an award within the prescribed time "shall not be grounds for challenge of the
Award." See Zubrod, supra note 12, at __ n.13.
12. 10 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 2 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Zubrod].
13. Id. at __.
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Mr. Zubrod does agree that some delay is arbitrator-inspired. 4 He
takes issue, however, with the suggestions put forth in my previous arti-
cle for resolving arbitrator-inspired delay. In this brief rejoinder, I seek
to explain why Mr. Zubrod's criticisms of my proposals are unsound,
and why New York maritime arbitration does need to adopt my
proposals.
II. RESPONSES To MR. ZUBROD
My earlier article advocated four basic changes. 5 Summarized
briefly, these changes were as follows: A) the disclosure by each arbi-
trator of his future schedule; B) the imposition of strict time limits for
the rendering of an award; C) the elimination of written opinions un-
less such opinions were requested by both parties; and, D) the institu-
tion of an expedited arbitration system for emergency cases.
Mr. Zubrod has called these proposals "totally unfeasible," and
has sought to discredit them by labelling them "unreasonable" and
"impractical.""' With respect, it is suggested that the proposals are
workable and would be easy to implement and administer. To prove
this, the proposals are reviewed below, together with Mr. Zubrod's crit-
icisms and my replies.
A. Arbitrator Schedule Disclosure
Under the first proposal, arbitrators would be required to disclose
their schedules within fifteen days of their appointment. If an arbitra-
tor's disclosure indicated that he would be unable to decide the case in
a timely fashion, the opposing party would be able to demand that the
nomination be withdrawn and a new arbitrator appointed. Three such
challenges would be allowed, with further challenges permitted if leave
of court was obtained.
The purpose of this proposal is to ensure that arbitrators can
devote sufficient time to a matter. Mr. Zubrod contends that the propo-
sal is flawed because arbitrators cannot deduce how much time a par-
ticular case will require at the time of their appointment. Mr. Zubrod
therefore argues that the rule places an arbitrator under an unfair
handicap.
Of course, the rule does no such thing, for it does not ask the arbi-
trator to evaluate whether he has enough time to hear the matter.
14. Id. at __.
15. Jarvis, supra note I, at 56-61.
16. Zubrod, supra note 12, at _.
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Rather, the rule places that burden on the parties and their attorneys.
This is particularly appropriate since at the outset of an arbitration
parties and their attorneys are usually in a good position to make an
estimate of the amount of arbitrator-time a case will require. In most
instances, the attorneys will already know what facts are in dispute,
and will probably have learned through settlement negotiations what
arguments the other side is likely to raise, and can gauge, usually with
significant accuracy, how many witnesses will have to be called, how
many documents will have to be submitted into evidence, and how
many hearings will be needed.
Mr. Zubrod objects to placing such control in the hands of the
parties because to do so, he says, would introduce "an element of court-
room legality" 17 into the arbitration process. It is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to comprehend how the rule adds "courtroom legality" to the ar-
bitration. Perhaps what Mr. Zubrod meant is that the rule puts
arbitrators under the scrutiny of the parties, thereby making the arbi-
trators accountable to the parties. If so, such accountability is to be
applauded. It not only assures current parties of a speedy resolution, it
encourages potential parties to use the system. By preventing parties
from selecting an already overburdened arbitrator in hopes of slowing
down the arbitration,1 8 the system is able to function as intended.
The rule is also easily administered. Since arbitrators are already
required to disclose possible bias or interest in the outcome,19 the dis-
closure of the arbitrator's schedule can be made at the same time.
Thus, the rule adds little, if any, additional work for the arbitrator.
Indeed, if the rule is adopted, it is likely that arbitrators would come to
appreciate it, for it would provide an easy means of allowing an arbi-
trator to review at a glance his upcoming schedule and commitments.20
17. Id. at __.
18. As pointed out in my earlier article, there is a certain advantage for an arbi-
trator to develop a reputation for being able to slow down a panel, in order to gain time
for the party which appointed him. Jarvis, supra note I, at 43 n.107.
19. Id. at 45-46.
20. Indeed, the London Maritime Arbitrators Association recently adopted a sys-
tem which has many of the same characteristics as the one I proposed. See London
Maritime Arbitrators Association, The L.M.A.A. Terms 1987 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as 1987 Terms]. Under these terms, London maritime arbitrators are required to
set a hearing within a set period of time after the case is ready to be submitted by the
parties. For example, a dispute which is estimated to require between three and five
days of hearings must have a hearing date set for it within six months of the time that
the arbitrators are advised that the case is ready to proceed. Id. at the Fifth Schedule.
Moreover, an arbitrator unable to offer a date within the required period must with-
draw from the arbitration unless the parties agree to forego the Terms. Id. See gener-
A REJOINDER TO MR. ZUBROD
B. Time Limits
At one time, of course, the rules of the Society of Maritime 4rbi-
trators required awards to be rendered in a set time. This system was
replaced in 1983 by the current rule, which simply requires arbitrators
to render their award as soon as practicable. As explained above, how-
ever, Society members now are being encouraged (but are not re-
quired) to render their awards with 120 days. This is in stark contrast
to London maritime arbitrators who, under their recently amended
Terms, are now being encouraged to render their awards within forty-
two days.2 1
Under my proposal, arbitrators would be required to render their
awards within either forty-five or ninety days of the close of evidence,
depending upon whether the parties had requested a written opinion
explaining the basis for the arbitrators' decision. Arbitrators would be
prohibited from either asking for or granting an extension of the time.
In the event that the time limit was violated, the parties then would be
free either to treat the arbitration as a nullity or to extend the arbitra-
tors' time. In the event the award was not rendered on time and a party
suffered damage as a result, the arbitrators would become personally
liable for such damages.
Mr. Zubrod predicts that the adoption of this rule will result in a
great deal of wasted effort if the arbitrators miss the deadline and then
are prevented from rendering their award. 22 This, of course, is true.
Mr. Zubrod's suggestion for dealing with this problem, however, is un-
satisfactory. He suggests that users of the system depend upon the in-
tegrity and ability of the individual arbitrators to issue the award in a
timely manner.2 8
The rendering of a timely award, however, has little to do with an
arbitrator's integrity or ability. The fact is that arbitrators, like lawyers
and clients, push off difficult tasks, leaving them for the last possible
moment. 2' By setting a strict deadline, the rule accepts this fact and
simply tries to ensure that the last possible moment will come sooner
rather than later.
Mr. Zubrod also objects to making arbitrators liable if, through
ally Hughes, Arbitration Body Speeds Maritime Case Hearings, Financial Times, Oct.
29, 1986, at 9, col. I.
21. 1987 Terms, supra note 20, at Term 18.
22. Zubrod, supra note 12, at -.
23. Id. at _.
24. Jarvis, supra note I, at 40 n.93.
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their failure to issue a timely award, a party becomes aggrieved. 25 Mr.
Zubrod argues that if such a rule were to be instituted, maritime arbi-
trators will simple refuse to continue as arbitrators. There is, however,
no support for Mr. Zubrod's conclusion.
As my earlier article pointed out, if the rule were to be adopted,
arbitrators would purchase malpractice insurance to insulate them-
selves from liability. Malpractice insurance has long been carried by
lawyers, doctors, accountants, and other professionals," and maritime
arbitrators could easily finance such insurance by building the cost into
their fees.
Perhaps what Mr. Zubrod had in mind was the unpaid commer-
cial arbitrator who renders his service as a contribution to the commu-
nity. Of course, maritime arbitrators in New York are handsomely re-
warded for their services, often commanding fees on a par with that of
the lawyers who handle the arbitration." Indeed, many persons in New
York have turned to arbitration for their primary income, and have
gone so far as to style themselves as "professional arbitrators. 8 Given
this state of events, it is not only easy for maritime arbitrators to afford
malpractice insurance, it is entirely appropriate.
C. The Elimination of Written Opinions
The third proposal calls for the elimination of written opinions ex-
plaining the basis of the award, unless both parties request such an
opinion. Mr. Zubrod suggests that such "reasoned awards," as he
termed them," should be retained because: 1) maritime attorneys
would object to their elimination; 2) London maritime arbitrators do
not supply such reasons, thereby providing New York with an edge;
and, 3) such awards provide important precedent.
Upon close inspection, none of these reasons are sound. First,
whether maritime attorneys want or need such awards is irrelevant.
The question is whether, in a given case, the parties need an award.
Since, as Mr. Zubrod admits, the writing of an opinion is a laborious
25. Zubrod, supra note 12, at
26. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 59 n.167.
27. Id. at 37 n.86. It should also be noted that unlike attorneys, arbitrators do not
have the overhead expense of rent, staff, and library and word processing facilities.
28. Id.
29. By using the term "reasoned award," Mr. Zubrod implies that awards ren-
dered without formal, written opinions are unreasoned. This argument is an oft-re-
peated one. See id. at 42 n.101. There never has been, however, any proof to support the
argument and many, if not most, arbitration systems function without written opinions.
Id. at 40 n.92 and accompanying text.
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process which can delay the rendering of an award for months, 30 there
may be much to lose by agreeing to wait for a written opinion. Not
only can the losing party become judgment-proof while the award is
being written, mistakes in the opinion often provide a basis for chal-
lenging the award in court.3 1 When such a challenge is made, the win-
ner of the award must expend additional time and money, and the reso-
lution of the dispute is further delayed.
Second, the suggestion that New York holds an edge over London
because of the publishing of opinions is debatable at best. When parties
consider possible arbitration sites their attention focuses on such mat-
ters as the availability of qualified arbitrators and attorneys, the conve-
nience of arbitrating in a particular city, and the financial costs
involved.
In any event, Mr. Zubrod's concern is misplaced, since the pro-
posed rule does not eliminate written opinions. Rather, it simply re-
quires both parties to agree that a written opinion will be issued. The
reason why the rule requires both parties to agree is obvious. Under the
second of my four rules, if no opinion is required, arbitrators are given
forty-five days to render their decision. If, however, an opinion is re-
quired, arbitrators are given ninety days. The additional forty-five days
are given in recognition of the fact that drafting an opinion is a time-
consuming activity. If one party to the arbitration sought to delay a
final decision, it could do so by asking for a written opinion. Thus, the
rule requires mutual consent to ensure that parties cannot use written
opinions as an instrument of delay.
The third reason cited by Mr. Zubrod for written opinions has to
do with their value as precedent. It should be recalled, however, that
courts have routinely held that arbitrators have no duty to provide rea-
sons for their decisions,82 and that parties cannot complain when arbi-
trators refuse or fail to follow prior arbitration decisions.33 Thus, it is
unclear who, if anyone, benefits from written opinions. Although Mr.
Zubrod suggests that such opinions are necessary for the arbitration
system to function properly, the London maritime arbitration system
has not suffered from the lack of such opinions. And while it is true
that a recent poll has shown that many maritime lawyers believe that it
is useful to refer to prior arbitration decisions,3" there is no empirical
30. Zubrod, supra note 12, at __.
31. Jarvis, supra note 1, at 60 n.171 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 40 n.94.
33. Id. at n.95.
34. Id. As my earlier article noted however, this poll suffers from numerous flaws
in methodology. Id. at n.81.
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support for this view. 5
D. Expedited Arbitration
The final proposal would set up a system of expedited arbitration,
under which arbitrators would be required to render their decision
within seven days of the close of the hearings. Mr. Zubrod suggests
that this proposal is unnecessary because the rules of the Society of
Maritime Arbitrators already provide for expedited arbitration.
In fact, there is a need for the acceptance of my proposal because
unlike the present expedited system, which requires both parties to re-
quest an expedited decision," my proposal allows either party to re-
quest and receive an expedited decision. Of course, if the other party
believes that there was no need for an expedited arbitration, it can at-
tempt to prove a lack of need. If such lack of need is proven, the arbi-
trator then awards to the party which did not want the expedited pro-
cedure three times the cost it was put to in complying with the
expedited procedure.
III. CONCLUSION
The problem of delay is a serious one .in maritime arbitrations.
Fortunately, the New York maritime bar and arbitrator community
have recognized this fact and have begun to take steps to reduce delay.
Much, however, remains to be done.
The four proposals put forward in my earlier article would go far
in reducing delay. Because my article and the proposals contained
therein dealt only with arbitrator-inspired delay, Mr. Zubrod's article
is useful because it identifies and suggests solutions to party-inspired
delay.
It is when Mr. Zubrod discusses arbitrator-inspired delay that his
article falls down. His suggestion for dealing with arbitrator-inspired
delay is to rely simply on the present system. It has already been shown
that the present system allows - indeed, encourages - arbitrator-in-
spired delay. If arbitrator-inspired delay is to be reduced to tolerable
35. Although Mr. Zubrod suggests that citations to past decisions are useful, Zu-
brod, supra note 12, at -, arbitration panels can and do regularly ignore such deci-
sions because the principle of stare decisis has not been adopted in arbitration. Jarvis,
supra note I, at 40 n.95 and at 42, n.100.
36. Zubrod, supra note 12, at __. Indeed, the requirement that both parties
agree to expedited arbitration has been cited as a major failing of the present system.
See Address by Lawrence G. Cohen, Society of Maritime Arbitrators Annual Seminar
(Feb. 27, 1985).
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levels, more of the same is not the answer. The answer lies in changing
the system so that the potential for arbitrator-inspired delay is reduced.
